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Epistemology

ih-pis-tuh-MOL-uh-jee
Also Known As Theory of Knowledge

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The branch of philosophy that studies knowledge itself: what it is, how it differs from mere belief, and how, if at all, it can be justified. The classical analysis treats knowledge as justified true belief, a formula traced to Plato's Theaetetus, though Edmund Gettier's 1963 counterexamples showed that justified true belief can still fall short of knowledge, opening a live debate over what a fourth condition would have to add. Epistemology also asks where knowledge comes from: rationalists such as Descartes held that reason alone can establish some truths, while empiricists such as Locke and Hume held that all substantive knowledge of the world must ultimately trace back to sense experience. Scepticism, the challenge that we may know far less than we assume, runs through the branch from Pyrrho to Descartes' own methodical doubt.

Facts
Disputed
Key Debate
Internalism versus externalism about justification: internalists hold that what justifies a belief must be accessible from within the believer's own perspective, on reflection alone, while externalists such as reliabilists hold that a belief can be justified by standing in a reliable relation to the world, such as ordinary perception, that the believer need not be aware of at all. 1
Whether justification is a matter of the believer's own accessible reasons or can be conferred by a reliable process the believer need not be aware of divides epistemologists into internalist and externalist camps.
Key Debate
The Gettier problem: Edmund Gettier's 1963 counterexamples showed that a belief can be justified and true purely by luck without amounting to knowledge, so justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge; the search for a fourth condition, or a wholly different analysis of knowledge, remains open more than sixty years later. 1
Edmund Gettier's 1963 three-page paper overturned a definition of knowledge many philosophers had treated as settled, and the search for a replacement has not converged.
Central Question
What can we know, and how do we know it? 1
Key Debate
Rationalism versus empiricism: whether substantive knowledge can be reached by reason alone, as Descartes argues from the cogito, or requires grounding in sense experience, as Locke argues against any innate ideas. 1
Cross-Tradition Connections

Associated With

Includes

Qualia, Concepts
Zhuangzi, Philosophers
Sources
1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and Informationentry: Epistemology
Quote, entry: Epistemology
The term "epistemology" comes from the Greek words "episteme" and "logos". "Episteme" can be translated as "knowledge" or "understanding" or "acquaintance", while "logos" can be translated as "account" or "argument" or "reason".
View the Source
1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and Informations.v. EpistemologyView the Source
1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and Informationentry: Rene Descartes; entry: John LockeView the Source
1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and Informations.v. The Analysis of KnowledgeView the Source
1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and Informations.v. Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic JustificationView the Source
1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and InformationIncludes: PlatoView the Source
1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and InformationIncludes: Immanuel KantView the Source
1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and InformationIncludes: David HumeView the Source
1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and InformationIncludes: The Critique of Pure ReasonView the Source
1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and InformationIncludes: The Problem of InductionView the Source
1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and InformationIncludes: John LockeView the Source
1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and InformationIncludes: SocratesView the Source
1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and InformationIncludes: Rene DescartesView the Source
1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and InformationIncludes: Rationalism, s.v. Rationalism vs. EmpiricismView the Source
1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and InformationIncludes: Empiricism, s.v. Rationalism vs. EmpiricismView the Source
1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and InformationAssociated With: Plato, entry: Epistemology; Plato's TheaetetusView the Source
1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and InformationIncludes: Pyrrho of ElisView the Source
Epistemology (Wikipedia)
WikipediaIntroduction
Quote, Introduction
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that examines the nature, origin, and limits of knowledge. Also called the theory of knowledge, it explores different types of knowledge.
View the Source
Ancient Skepticism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Includes: Pyrrhonism
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Includes: Nyaya, entry: Nyaya, Introduction
Quote, Includes: Nyaya, entry: Nyaya, Introduction
Epistemologically, Nyaya develops a sophisticated precursor to contemporary reliabilism (particularly process reliabilism), centered on the notion of knowledge-sources (pramana).
View the Source
Tabula Rasa (Wikipedia)
WikipediaIncludes: Tabula Rasa, Introduction
Quote, Includes: Tabula Rasa, Introduction
Tabula rasa; Latin for "blank slate"
View the Source
Open Questions (3 open questions)
What Satisfies the Missing Condition for Knowledge?

Edmund Gettier's 1963 counterexamples showed that justified true belief, the classical tripartite analysis inherited from Plato's Theaetetus, is not sufficient for knowledge: there are cases of justified true belief that still fall short of knowing. Epistemologists have proposed many candidate fourth conditions since, but the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's own survey concludes that despite considerable attention, particularly in the late twentieth century, no analysis has been widely accepted.

What would resolve this A precise, counterexample-resistant fourth condition, or a replacement analysis of knowledge altogether, that a broad consensus of epistemologists converges on rather than one that continues to generate further counterexamples.
EpistemologyThe Analysis of Knowledge (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
What must be added to, or substituted for, justified true belief for a definition of knowledge that survives Gettier-style counterexamples?

Since Edmund Gettier's 1963 paper, proposed fourth conditions (a no-false-lemmas clause, causal theories, reliabilism, safety and sensitivity conditions, virtue epistemology) have each met their own counterexamples, and no replacement analysis commands consensus.

What would resolve this An analysis of knowledge that survives every known Gettier-style case without ruling out clear cases of ordinary knowledge would resolve it; some epistemologists instead argue the project of analyzing knowledge into more basic conditions should be abandoned.
EpistemologyStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Must what justifies a belief be accessible from within the believer's own perspective, or can a reliable process the believer is unaware of confer justification?

Internalists argue that a justification a thinker cannot access from the inside cannot be doing any justifying work for that thinker; externalists reply that small children and animals plainly have justified perceptual beliefs despite being unable to reflect on their own reliability. Neither side has produced a case the other accepts as decisive.

What would resolve this A shared account of what justification is FOR, whether it is about the thinker's own responsible believing or about tracking truth, would settle which condition is required; the two camps currently start from different accounts of that point.
EpistemologyStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Dissenting Readings (2 dissenting readings)
Key Debate

Williamson rejects the entire project of analyzing knowledge into justified true belief plus a further condition: on his knowledge-first view, knowledge is itself the most basic mental state, not a compound built from belief, truth and justification, so Gettier cases show only that the analytic project was misconceived from the start, not that it merely needs a fourth condition.

A dissenting reading, from Timothy WilliamsonStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and Information
Key Debate

Goldman argues that reliabilism, an externalist theory on which a belief is justified when produced by a process that reliably yields true beliefs, better matches ordinary judgments about knowledge than internalism does: a subject with no access at all to why their perception is reliable, a small child, for instance, is still credited with justified perceptual beliefs, which internalism's access requirement cannot easily accommodate.

A dissenting reading, from Alvin GoldmanStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and Information

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