What Satisfies the Missing Condition for Knowledge?
Edmund Gettier's 1963 counterexamples showed that justified true belief, the classical tripartite analysis inherited from Plato's Theaetetus, is not sufficient for knowledge: there are cases of justified true belief that still fall short of knowing. Epistemologists have proposed many candidate fourth conditions since, but the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's own survey concludes that despite considerable attention, particularly in the late twentieth century, no analysis has been widely accepted.
What would resolve this A precise, counterexample-resistant fourth condition, or a replacement analysis of knowledge altogether, that a broad consensus of epistemologists converges on rather than one that continues to generate further counterexamples.
EpistemologyThe Analysis of Knowledge (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
What must be added to, or substituted for, justified true belief for a definition of knowledge that survives Gettier-style counterexamples?
Since Edmund Gettier's 1963 paper, proposed fourth conditions (a no-false-lemmas clause, causal theories, reliabilism, safety and sensitivity conditions, virtue epistemology) have each met their own counterexamples, and no replacement analysis commands consensus.
What would resolve this An analysis of knowledge that survives every known Gettier-style case without ruling out clear cases of ordinary knowledge would resolve it; some epistemologists instead argue the project of analyzing knowledge into more basic conditions should be abandoned.
EpistemologyStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Must what justifies a belief be accessible from within the believer's own perspective, or can a reliable process the believer is unaware of confer justification?
Internalists argue that a justification a thinker cannot access from the inside cannot be doing any justifying work for that thinker; externalists reply that small children and animals plainly have justified perceptual beliefs despite being unable to reflect on their own reliability. Neither side has produced a case the other accepts as decisive.
What would resolve this A shared account of what justification is FOR, whether it is about the thinker's own responsible believing or about tracking truth, would settle which condition is required; the two camps currently start from different accounts of that point.
EpistemologyStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy